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Resumo: Este artigo apresenta as idéias de Adam Smith sobre tributação e gasto
público, que têm sido muito utilizadas no debate contemporâneo sobre
o liberalismo. Por meio de um extenso uso das passagens sobre os
“deveres do soberano” e das “máximas de tributação”, conclui-se que
a defesa da descentralização e a preocupação com o crescimento dos
gastos públicos dão o pano de fundo às idéias de Smith. O artigo
destaca também o papel crucial das “máximas” e contrapõe-se à usual
interpretação de que a teoria da incidência presente na Riqueza das
Nações é contraditória e até mesmo sem rumo, face à contemporização
de Smith com as práticas de tributação de seu tempo.
Palavras-chave: Adam Smith, tributação, gasto público.
Abstract: This paper presents Adam Smith’s view on taxation and public
expenditure, by means of an almost literal reading of the Wealth of
Nations famous passages on the “duties of the sovereign” and on the
“maxims of taxation”. Contrarily to the commonest usage of these
passages, we will show that their core is the preoccupation with the
public expenditure soaring and the defence of decentralisation. Fur-
thermore – and also contrarily to the existing interpretations – we
defend the non-existence of any contradiction between Smith’s in-
come and price theory (and the incidence hypothesis), provided due
attention is paid to the guiding role of the “maxims”.
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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 25th Congress of the
History of Economics Society, Montreal, 1998.
2 Institute of Economics/UNICAMP.1 INTRODUCTION
The submission of The Wealth of Nations’ passages on
taxation and public expenditure to the scrutiny of the post-Pigouvian public
finance theory has been one of the main by-products of the renewed interest
in Adam Smith, provoked by the liberal tide of the 1970s and 80s. Musgrave’s
(1975) and West’s (1990) concern with market failure, Musgrave’s (1976)
comparisons between modern tax fairness concepts and the Smithian max-
ims, Buchanan’s (1976) attention to the “public badness” of governmental
action, are just a few examples of the influence of updated analytical findings
on the Smith revival.
In spite of the analytical ingenuity of the public good theory,
the extension of present days public finance to the classical political economy
is not a simple task. The fact that modern economic concepts hardly match
with ideas deeply rooted in the intellectual scenery of the eighteenth century
stands as a general drawback. Besides, and particularly in what concerns
taxation and public expenditure, the misunderstandings have been fuelled
by a strong disjunction, which puts public finance theorists on one side and
specialists in the 18th century liberalism on the other side. While the former
stick to the rationality of modern economics, the latter attempt to put
Smith’s ideas in the context of his time.
3 
Winch’s position is illustrative of the effects of such a disjunc-
tion. Winch’s well-known praise of the “historical method” – included in
his criticism of the 18th century liberalism commentators exclusively
devoted to the “rational method” – is surely aimed at the practitioners of
modern economic theory. In the last chapter of his work on Adam Smith’s
politics (Winch, 1978), it was Stigler’s quest for rationality in Smith’s
ideas on politics
4 that was taken as the example of an intransigent use
of the “rational method”. The clear relation between Stigler’s arguments
and Smith’s positions on state and markets notwithstanding, Winch
symptomatically skipped more specific remarks on taxation and public
expenditure,
5 thus reinforcing an implicitly established agreement: while
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3 A broad variety of themes and authors pay respect to the 18th century frame.
Among them, the studies on the Scottish Enlightenment (Macfie, 1967;
Campbell & Skinner, 1976; Winch, 1978); the reappraisal of Smith’s jurispru-
dence (Taylor, 1965; Lamb, 1987); or even the recovery of Smith’s rhetoric
(Brown, 1994).
4 Stigler (1971) gets surprised because Smith, who was so attentive to the role
of self-interest in economic affairs, failed to give due attention to its role as a
general rule to explain the legislation.
5 Winch’s book does include a chapter on public debt.the public finance theorists drive their efforts to the application of
post-Pigouvian categories to Book V, the other economists and philoso-
phers avoid Book V’s content.
6 As far as taxation and public expenditure
matters are necessarily embedded in political and philosophical reason-
ing, it is not difficult to figure out the shortcomings brought about by this
division of labour.
This article is targeted to a restricted incursion into the
empty space created by the above referred dichotomy. By means of a
recollection of frequently used and (to my concern) poorly understood
passages from The Wealth of Nations, I will attempt an intermediate
track between the usual application of welfare economics to Smith and
the more ambitious endeavour of establishing a methodological contrast
between modern public economics and the economics of Adam Smith.  
The structure of the text follows the structure of The
Wealth of Nations’ Book V. Apart from this introduction, a second
section discusses the “duties of the sovereign”, and a third one attempts
to apply some lessons collected in the “taxation maxims”. The final
remarks venture to introduce some afterthoughts on the role of the
taxation and public expenditure passages, considering the framework of
Smith’s liberalism. 
Although the article contains references to conflicting inter-
pretations, it is not meant to provide a systematic account of the diverse
comments on the public finance chapters. On the contrary, its purpose is
to try a meaningful and independent account, which can be summarised
by the following points:
1) Smith’s ideas on taxation and public expenditure have,
as a point of reference, the perspective of an increase in
the governmental duties, as well as the preoccupation,
also to be encountered in the Lectures on Jurispru-
dence, with the blocking effects of inadequate taxes;
2) the possibility of a  decentralised provision of the “publick
works and institutions”, besides the general contrast
between  centralisation and decentralisation (and not
between public and private expenditure, or between state
and markets), are the central themes within the “duties
of the sovereign”;
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6 The few exceptions are Musgrave (1976), who takes into consideration the
ethics of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in his analysis of equity and, to
a lesser extent, Rosenberg (1960), who insists on the importance of political
institutions in Smith’s works.3) the taxation maxims organise and drive the concrete anal-
ysis of the existing taxes and, among the criteria encompas-
sed by the maxims, equality performs a subsidiary role;
4) the existing collisions between the incidence theory and
the recommended taxes, may almost always be explained
by the patterns provided by the maxims.
2 THE “DUTIES OF THE SOVEREIGN”
 The general framework for the analysis of taxation and
public expenditures in Smith includes two issues. Firstly, the conclusion
that the progress of societies implies an increase in government commit-
ments, therefore provoking a growing pressure on public resources.
Secondly, the concern with the negative impacts that inadequate taxes
might impose on production. Both issues strongly influenced the lengthy
passages on the advantages and disadvantages of the several types of
taxes, and the exposition of the “duties of the sovereign” itself.
The attention to the negative impacts of taxes is a permanent
underlying issue, influential in the comments on the types of public
resources in several countries, inserted in the second chapter of Book V
of  The Wealth of Nations. Many fiscal experiences, and especially
examples from France, illustrate the idea that wrong fiscal systems
impose insurmountable barriers to the growth of wealth. This is but a
refinement of a general conception, already exposed in the Lectures on
Jurisprudence, according to which taxes and monopolies are detrimen-
tal to the opulence of nations.
The Lectures put “commerce and taxation” at the same
level, i. e., fiscal and commercial policies, items belonging to the nucleus
of Smith’s liberal platform. As a matter of fact, a still unsophisticated
theory of value and prices, characteristic of the Lectures, drove Smith
to the conclusion that taxes and monopolies exerted a similar impact, by
raising the market price of commodities above their natural price. For
this reason, the  police, set of policies favouring opulence, included
taxation norms as well as the prescription of combating monopolies. The
further development of the value and price theory allowed Smith to
improve the comprehension of both monopolies and taxation, which
became independent subjects in the Wealth of Nations, but it did not
attenuate the strong concern with the effects of taxation on production,
as we will see.
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societies and the duties of governments – became more apparent in the
Wealth of Nations. In a certain way, this issue underlies the exposition
of government tasks, embodied in the “duties of the sovereign”.
Since modern economists have taken the most suggestive clues
for a discussion of public goods in Smith from passages of the “duties of the
sovereign”, it is convenient to have them reviewed in some detail. For the
sake of clearness, I will anticipate further conclusions. To my concern, when
discussing the “duties of the sovereign”, Smith aimed at two points:
– on the one hand, the growth of the public expenditure/
wealth ratio, a feature inherent to the development of
societies;
– on the other hand, the overloading of the Central Treasury,
occasioned by the soaring of public expenditures.
Accordingly, his attention was driven to the harmless types
of general taxes (subject of Chapter 2), and to the feasible ways of
decentralising expenses and/or to the alternative sources of revenues
(subject of Chapter 1).
But let us examine the “duties of the sovereign”. Modern
economists have considered the first and the second duties incontestable
points within the government agenda. In fact, they comprise the defence
against foreign enemies and the establishment of justice, typical cases of
public goods. Contrarily, the third duty has aroused a considerable and
polemical interest, because it comprises the “publick goods and institu-
tions” designed to “facilitate the commerce”, which are located on the
boundaries between market and state, therefore requiring a subtle analy-
sis based on market failure.
Instead of insisting on a strict opposition among the duties,
I think it is worthwhile emphasising that the first and second duties also
partake Smith’s concern with the excessive tax burden. The expenses
with defence against foreign aggression should be taken as an eloquent
illustration of the growing pressures on the “general revenue”, caused by
the soaring costs of modern (specialised) armies and by the impossibility
of decentralising its defrayal. By its turn, although it contributes to
overload the Treasury, the duty of providing justice allows a partial
funding by the direct beneficiaries of the lawsuit, thus alleviating “gen-
eral revenue”.
As a matter of fact, the existence or non-existence of direct
benefits is the central issue in designing adequate modes of funding. This
point is clearly expressed in the “Conclusion of the Chapter”, a synthetic
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Smith states that the first two duties differ because one of them accrues
to the “general benefit of the whole society”,
7 whereas the other, in
addition to its accrual to the general benefit, produces a special direct
benefit.
8 In this perspective, the third duty might be seen as an extreme
case in the scale from general to particular benefits: the expenses included
in it benefit the whole society, but are “most immediately and directly
beneficial” (Smith, 1976a, p. 815) to the direct users of the goods. The
existence of immediate and direct benefits is a necessary condition for the
much praised exaction of extra-Treasury revenues, as tolls and tariffs.
9
Provided the necessary condition is fulfilled – the existence
of direct as well as general benefits –, it is possible to take the third duty
as an additional example of the preoccupation with growing expenses. In
discussing the third duty, Smith’s purpose was to balance the conven-
iences and inconveniences of the social arrangements constructed by
many nations to assure the provision of commodities and services, which
were increasingly important to commercial societies, urging for their
decentralisation whenever possible, i. e., whenever there were direct
benefits and the individual contributions were enforceable.
Before considering the alternative funding schemes, let us
return to the public good concept and try to relate it to the third duty.
According to The Wealth of Nations:
“The third and last duty of the sovereign or
commonwealth is that of erecting and maintai-
ning those publick works, which, though they
may be in the highest degree advantageous to a
great society, are, however, of such a nature, that
the profit could never repay the expence to any
individual or small number of individuals, and
which it, therefore, cannot be expected that any
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7 “The expence of defending the society, and that of supporting the dignity of the
chief magistrate, are both laid out for the general benefit of the whole society.
It is reasonable, therefore, that they should be defrayed by the general contri-
bution of the whole society...”. (Smith, 1976a, p. 814)
8 “The persons again most immediately benefited by this expence, are those
whom the courts of justice either restore to their rights, or maintain in their
rights. The expence of the administration of justice, therefore, may very
properly be defrayed by the particular contribution of one or other, or both of
those two different sets of persons...”. (Smith, 1976a, p. 815)
9 This point is connected with Smith’s attention to the benefit principle as a
fair way of defraying costs. More on benefit versus ability to pay below.individual or small number of individuals
should erect or maintain”. (Smith, 1976a, p. 723)
Besides the institutions necessary to the protection against
foreign enemies and to the provision of justice (dealt with in the first and
second duties), the “institutions and publick works” encompassed by the
above defined criteria are “...those for facilitating the commerce of the
society, and those for promoting the instruction of the people” (Smith,
1976a, p. 723). The first group includes the works and institutions that
facilitate “commerce in general” and “particular branches of commerce”,
being the works and institutions related to “commerce in general” those
usually associated to the modern usage of the public good concept, as
bridges, roads, water locks.
In order to assess the suitability of the public good concept
to the third duty, it is necessary to consider its composing elements, viz.,
externalities and indivisibility. Are we allowed to conclude, in a flexible
reading, that the fact of the works being considered “advantageous to a
great society” imply externality? Additionally, does the impossibility of
the profit to “repay the expence to any individual...” suggest either
positive externalities or indivisibility? 
A strict externality interpretation is hardly compatible with
the Wealth of Nations. Quite ably, Musgrave (1985) considers the
existence of externality situations not so indisputable in Smith as in
Hume’s notorious meadow drainage example. “Advantageous to a great
society”, rather refers to an unspecified general benefit and not to actions
whose consequences spill over other agents, being their individual bene-
fits measurable. 
On the other hand, the analysts generally accept that some
passages of the third duty resemble the public good reasoning and, as far
as the public good concept depends on indivisibility, such an allowance
would mean an indirect acceptance of the indivisibility case.
10 However,
West (1990) has consistently disputed the indivisibility case, showing that
The Wealth of Nations considers scarce examples of pure indivisibility.
Indeed, soon after presenting the third duty, Smith suggests alternatives
for the defrayal of its several components, insisting on the role of tariffs
and tolls. The absence of obstacles to have the costs of building and
maintenance of roads, channels and schooling – the bulk of the “publick
work and institutions” – paid by the direct beneficiaries, confirms the
divisibility of these services.
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10 Musgrave (1985) and Buchanan (1976), among others, admit the existence of
a public good concept in the Wealth of Nations.Yet, irrespective of complying with West’s position on divisi-
bility, a sort of addition to the public goods debate might be added. The
goods and services funded by tariffs and tolls continue to be considered
public works and institutions, that is, services whose provision is not
(and should not be) arranged by the market. Smith  does not dispute the
necessity of governmental provision, in spite of the possibilities of having
the works maintained by tolls and tariffs. They are “duties of the
sovereign” for reasons of a social and political nature, despite the works
that “facilitate the commerce” might also be justified on utility grounds,
as we will see later.
The adequate mix of funding alternatives – completely fun-
ded by the general revenue, partial or total refunding via tariffs and tolls
– is an issue to be submitted to the feasibility criterion and to the existence
of direct beneficiaries. At any rate, we must clearly distinguish the
funding options from the nature of the duties. The choice of funding
alternatives does not define the public or private character of the good,
as the following analysis of the tolls and tariffs matter will show.
Several reasons lead Smith to recommend the defrayal of
public works to be put upon the shoulders of the direct beneficiaries,
and/or under the responsibility of local authorities. I think the arguments
in favour of the decentralised funding of public goods make one of the
main points of the first chapter, providing an optimistic contrast to the
pessimistic conclusions about the increasing trend of the pressures on
the Central Treasury. Curiously, this issue has barely impressed the
analysts.
Let us begin by the tolls and tariffs. Soon after calling our
attention to the increasing weight of the third duty, Smith reassures the
reader by the conclusion that:
“It does not seem necessary that the expence of
those publick works should be defrayed from that
publick revenue... of which the collection and
application is in most countries assigned to the
executive power. The greater part of such publick
works may easily be so managed, as to afford a
particular revenue sufficient for defraying their
own expence, without bringing any burden upon
the general revenue of the society”. (Smith, 1976a,
p. 724)
The manifest purpose of tolls and tariffs, therefore, is to
alleviate the “general revenue of the society”. 
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taxing modes of funding:
1) they represent an equitable criterion of funding;
11
2) they admit the establishment of some progressiveness,
through differentiated tariffs (for  instance, carriages
should pay a higher toll than haulage charts);
12
3) the tolls and tariffs block excessive and unjustified public
expenses, because, whenever the burden falls upon the
customers, the works “... must be suited to what the
commerce can afford to pay”. (Smith, 1976a, p. 725)
All these additional benefits reinforce the convenience of
having the responsibility for the funding put out of the Treasury realm.
Besides, the tariff funding allows the works to be put under the control
of businessmen, a factor that connects the quality of the services to the
amounts to be gathered, thus stimulating managerial efficiency.
Smith put such a high valuation on funding mechanisms that
stimulate efficiency that he advised in favour of moving public works of
strictly local interest into the responsibility of local authorities, instead
of central authorities, even when the “general revenue” shared the
burden. The central government should transfer the management in the
name of efficiency, so many were the advantages of decentralised man-
agement.
In the funding matter, the main topics are the contrast
between “general revenue” and decentralised revenues (tolls, tariffs, and
regional or local revenues in general), and the contrast between the
centralised and the decentralised administration, be it private or not. The
same contrast substantiates the famous considerations on school fund-
ing, where the central point still is the possibilities of removing the
funding out of the Treasury sphere. If the pupils can afford integral fees,
so better, but whenever the fees do not suffice to defray the salaries of
the teachers, reassures Smith, “... it still is not necessary that it should be
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11 Smith’s arguments are complex. This sort of funding is just because the
beneficiary obtains a net advantage from the public work: the reduction in the
costs of transport exceeds the price of the toll. There is equity because the
benefit/cost relation is bigger than one and “his payment is exactly in propor-
tion to his gain”. (Smith, 1976a, p. 725)
12 Under certain circumstances a progressive taxation is seen as a desirable
redistribution of income instrument. More on equity and distributive justice
in the next section.derived from that general revenue of the society...”. (Smith, 1976a, p. 759).
The educational institutions could be – as they already were, in England
– funded by regional revenues or by private donations from the sovereign
and from the wealthy people.
Additionally, Smith praised the performance-enhancing role
of the system of private fees, as his famous arguments against fixed
rewards to teachers show. It is not necessary to recall all the elements
in his well-known defence of public (even if privately paid) education,
but it should be noted Smith’s diatribe against fixed rewards shares the
same stick applicable to the public works and institutions in general. In
other words, they share the same efficiency criterion, generally assess-
able by the answer to a canonical question: “Have those publick endow-
ments contributed in general to promote the end of their institution?”.
(Smith, 1976a, p. 259).
To conclude: the “duties of the sovereign” passages do not
seek to establish rational standards, based on efficiency, for the public
expenses. These passages do not even entirely lay on economic reasoning.
The works and institutions that “facilitate the commerce” perform an
economic role – they stimulate economic progress – but they are not public
because of their indivisibility,  externality, non-excludability etc. The
provision of security, justice and education are political obligations of the
state, as – to a certain extent – the provision of works that “facilitate the
commerce” is.  How to ably fund these public works, avoiding to overload
a Central Treasury (the “general revenue”) already pressed by responsi-
bilities that cannot be delegated, is Smith’s central concern. Decentrali-
sation and the choice of efficiency-enhancing modes of funding are the
answer to this concern. 
3 THE PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION
The analysis of taxation and incidence, within the second
chapter of Book V, is one of the most important derivatives of the theory
of price and incomes disclosed in Book I. In Book V, Smith adds specific
hypotheses on price formation to the previously established mechanisms
of determination of the three categories of income (rent, wages, and
profits), in order to determine the real burden of each kind of tax. The
core of the theory of tax incidence are the principles determining wages,
profits, and the rent of land. These principles allowed Smith to surpass
the rather loose assertion that taxes “raise the market price above the
natural price”, still present in the Lectures, in a route to a complex
20 Nova Economia | Belo Horizonte | v. 11 | n. 2 | dez. 2001general equilibrium model of adjustments among taxes, prices, and
incomes.
13
With few exceptions, the analysts have left aside a proper
judgement of Smith’s theory of incidence, and have preferred to empha-
sise the supposed contradictions existing in its use. In fact, Book V
mingles the theory of incidence with political concerns and practical
knowledge, composing an apparently imprecise mix of theoretical princi-
ples and political common sense, considered as an example of Smith’s
pragmatism and/or as a proof of his analytical flaws.
14 Indeed, it is not
difficult to point out several examples of Smith’s acceptance of taxes that
are unbearable from the viewpoint of his income and incidence theory.
For instance, given the pivotal role of subsistence in wage determination,
it is impossible to admit that the burden of taxation may be transferred
to the workers’ shoulders. The same applies to taxes on wage goods, or
to taxes upon the rent of houses, which would be shifted to wages. Since
all taxes ultimately fall upon the “original revenues” – wages, profit, and
rent –, it is impossible to separate Smith’s ideas on incidence from his
income and price theory. In other words, how to reconcile Smith’s price
and income theory, and an approach to incidence entirely dependent on
it, with the pervasive common sense that seems to underlie the wise
comments and advice spread all along Book V?
One of the solutions for this dilemma is to take into account
the political economy as “science of the legislator”. The relations between
the theoretical principles and the prescriptions are never straightforward
in the “science of the legislator”. There are many steps between the
principles and their practical uses.
15 In this sense, the gap between theory
and prescriptions is intentional. The importance of the institutional
scenery is quite obvious for Smith. Nobody but him to know that taxation
rules are based on habits, traditions, and political interests, that is, that
a fiscal system has to be feasible in political terms.
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13 In fact, a rather incomplete equilibrium model, since the connection among
taxation, prices, and revenues remained inconsistent. More on the incomplete-
ness of Smith’s allocation model below.
14 On pragmatism and inconsistence in Smith principles of taxation, see
Figueiredo (1993) and Musgrave (1985) and Peacock (1985).
15 On political economy as “science of the legislator”, Winch (1991). Irrespec-
tive of Brown’s position (Brown (1994)), refusing to apply the expression
“science of the legislator” to the system of natural liberty, I think the
conclusions I gather from Winch might be considered immune to her specific
criticism.But my point goes further. I do not see the gap between the
economic theory of Book I and the advice on taxation as a sign either of
pragmatism or of analytical contradiction. If by pragmatism we under-
stand the lack of well-defined rules, such a qualification does not apply
to Smith’s proposals, because Smith considers a consistent set of norms
which, combined with the theory of incidence, tightly steer his warnings.
These norms are announced by the famous “four maxims”, of which the
subsequent and detailed description of the various types of taxes were
but an application.
16
Prior to the recollection of the maxims, it is convenient to
remind the general structure of the chapter on taxation. The second
chapter of Book V encompasses all the “sources of the general or publick
revenue of the society” (Smith, 1976a, p. 817), comprising taxes proper,
patrimonial revenues, and revenues from business owned and operated
by the state. Smith was caustic relatively to the civic virtues and man-
agerial expertise of public managers.
17 If we add to such an antagonism
his scepticism towards the efficiency of big organisations in general
(public or private), it will be easy to understand his pessimistic stance on
the opportunities of expanding public revenue by means of rent of public
land and profits of public capital. Therefore, no other instruments but
taxes were available to the defrayal of increasing expenses. As we have
already seen, this was a reason for permanent preoccupation.
This is the scenery behind Smith’s criticism of public admin-
istration, spread all through the second chapter. Such a criticism, gen-
erally taken as a defence of the privatist faith – which it partially is –
should also be seen as a warning about the impacts of the duties upon
general revenue. In the end, pressures on general revenue are due to the
governmental inability to control its expenses and gather extra-tax reve-
22 Nova Economia | Belo Horizonte | v. 11 | n. 2 | dez. 2001
16 That the analytical and historical content of the second chapter is an extension
and application of the maxims becomes quite clear when we pay attention to
the sentence located at the very end of the presentation of the maxims: “The
following short review of some of the principal taxes which have taken place
in different ages and countries will show that the endeavours of all nations
have not in this respect  – to act accordingly to the maxims (MC) – been equally
successful.”. (Smith, 1976a, p. 827-828)
17 “But whether such a government as that of England; which, whatever may
be its virtues, has never been famous for good economy; which, in time of
peace, has generally conducted itself with the slothful and negligent profu-
sion that is perhaps natural to monarchies; and in time of war has con-
stantly acted with all the thoughtless extravagance that democracies are apt
to fall into...” (Smith, 1976a, p.  818). Rosenberg (1960) was one of the first
authors to emphasise Smith’s worries in relation to public servants, sug-
gesting that this might be one of the main reasons for his privatist zeal.nues. The maxims on taxation and their illustrations have to be under-
stood in view of the shadow of an increasing tax burden.
The first maxim, which defines equality and inequality in
taxation, has upset analysts for more than one reason. First of all, Smith
proposes (in the same paragraph) both the benefit principle and the
ability to pay principle as adequate criteria of taxation. The benefit
principle seems to underlie the statement that the individual responsi-
bility for the public expense is similar to the compromises of “joint tenants
of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their
respective interests in the estate” (Smith, 1976a, p. 825), while the princi-
ple of ability to pay is present in the proposition that it is up to individuals
to pay the tax  “... in proportion to their respective abilities” (Smith, 1976a,
p. 825). Although the principles of benefit and ability to pay are today
admitted as different – and perhaps opposed – criteria of fairness, Smith
effectively adopted both. In some circumstances, he favoured a slight
progressiveness, referred to the level of income or wealth of the tax-pay-
ers, while, as a general mood, he seemed to be considerably impressed by
the ability to pay principle, as when arguing for tolls and tariffs.
The occasional defence of a very moderate progressiveness – in
the rent of houses, in the taxation of non-basic goods – should not be
overrated. Smith’s concept of equality is referred to the relative incidence
upon the three separate types of income. Equality, to him, implies the
avoidance of any tax, which might fall upon one of the three types of income,
excluding the others.
18 Additionally, his theory of price and income strictly
limits the possibilities of imposing an additional burden on wages and
profits, and this is a central part of his theory of incidence. The principle of
wage determination by the level of subsistence prevents the wages from
being taxed, directly or indirectly (taxes on wage goods); the theory of profits
hinders the taxation on profits, since they are admittedly the minimal
reward for the effort and risk; by its turn, the profit of specific trades cannot
be taxed because it would provoke inequality in profit rates, thus affecting
equilibrium in the stock market. Therefore, land-owners only, who cannot
shift the tax imposed upon their rent to prices, are the target. Since
land-owners have no option but to bear the tax, taxation of their rents do
not collide with Smith’s income determination theory.
It must be emphasised that it is this lack of flexibility,
determined by the theory of incidence, that puts equality policies in a
straitjacket. The sparse arguments favouring a smooth progressiveness
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18 “Every tax, it must be observed once and for all, which falls finally upon one
only of the three sorts of revenue..., is necessarily unequal, in so far as it does
not affect the other two.” (Smith, 1976a, p. 825)in certain taxes should not allow us to overturn Smith’s very secondary
concern with equality.
19
It is important to remind that Smith’s insistent arguing for the
tax on the rent of land does not rest on any concept of distributive justice;
on the contrary, this tax discriminates against one type of income, thus
harming equality. The support of progressiveness in the tax on house
rentals,
20 sometimes taken as a sign of his commitment to equality, is equally
part of a sinuous reasoning, in which the demonstration of the similarity
between the house-rent tax and the taxes on consumption goods (in the sense
that they fall upon all the three basic incomes) conceals the conclusion that
the rich, contrarily to the poor, would hardly succeed in having the tax
burden shifted. That is, as much as taxes on luxury goods, house-rent taxes
levied on rich people would not produce any impact on prices. The reasoning
is based on an allocation, rather than on an equality, concern.
But the sacrifice of equality to any other principle of taxation
is perhaps the decisive proof of the secondary role performed by equality
within the set of maxims. Whenever the precise assessment of the due
amounts to be taxed implies rigorous inspection, Smith abandons the
fairness commitments on the grounds of the vexation tax-payers would
be subjected to. Taxes which fall upon restricted categories of tax-payers
– being, therefore, unequal – are many times accepted, provided they
prove themselves suitable to the other principles. Such is the case of the
tax on the rent of land and taxes on luxury goods,
21 which discriminate
against determined classes of tax-payers, but conform to the other – and
much more important – principles, described in the other maxims.
The second maxim establishes the principle of certainty and
non-arbitrariness.
22 This principle strictly dominates equality, or, as
Smith puts it:
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19 Musgrave (1976) is one of the few analysts attentive to the active role of the
Smithean theory of price and income and to how it undermines the practice
of policies aimed at redistribution.
20 “A tax upon house-rents ... would in general fall heaviest upon the rich; and
in this sort of inequality there would not, perhaps, be any thing very unreason-
able”. (Smith, 1976a, p. 842)
21 Taxes on luxury goods harm equality because a greater proportion of the rich
people’s income is spent in luxury goods. Smith has no objection to the taxation
on luxury goods consumed by poor people, as spirits and tobacco, because, being
non-necessaries, they do not affect wages. He sees an additional advantage in the
inhibition of consumption, caused by price-raising effects of the tax.
22 “The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all
to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person”. (Smith, 1976a,
p. 825)“... a very considerable degree of inequality ... is
not near so great an evil as a very small degree
of uncertainty” (Smith, 1976a, p. 826). Smith’s
horizons were the arbitrary exaction practices of
his time. In his opinion, the countries where the
tax-gathering was commissioned to autonomous
agents of the kingdom displayed a large array of
fiscal abusing.
The convenience of taxation, including the time and manner
of payment, forms the third maxim, which also ranks high in Smith’s set
of preferences. Convenience and non-arbitrariness together explain
many of the admitted exceptions to the principle of equality and the
principle of minimal interference in the natural equilibrium. Smith
disliked taxes exacted in inadequate time, and praised taxes collected in
the moments tax-payers were solvent, as well as taxes exacted “little by
little” and in an imperceptible manner. The excises and taxes on con-
sumption goods in general, paid simultaneously to their acquisition,
seemed to him a good example of convenience. Taxes on luxury goods are
another example, reinforced, in this case, by the additional benefit of
choice, as far as the tax-payer might decide not to pay the tax, by simply
resigning to the acquisition of the commodity. Provided that we allow
land-owners to pay the tax at the same moment they receive the rent, the
land-rent tax may be taken as another example of convenience.
The principles defended by the second and third maxims aim
at preventing the tax-payer from facing any other annoyance than “...the
unavoidable one of being obliged to pay the tax” (Smith, 1976a, p. 834).
One of the main features of a good fiscal system is exactly the minimisa-
tion of an annoyance that is considerable in itself: to pay the tax. To cause
the least possible interference in the individual behaviour and in the
allocation equilibrium is another feature. Both features, embodied in the
second and third maxims, are also considered by the fourth maxim, which
is a very ample one, although it seems at a first sight to be only related
to the minimisation of the administrative costs of the fiscal apparatus.
23
In reality, of the four possible ways of transgressing the
fourth maxim, the first one, which concerns the salaries of the officers in
charge of the fiscal apparatus, strictly relates to administrative costs.
According to Smith, the value of the tax would also exceed the benefit
accrued to the Treasury when:
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23 “... to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible,
over and above what it brings into the publick treasury of the state”. (Smith,
1976a, p. 825)1) the tax hinders certain branches of business;
2) the penalties imposed on tax-evaders lead to the end of
the business, or to misbehaviour;
3) the fiscal controls are vexatious.
That is to say, the fourth maxim encompasses impacts on
allocation and moral effects harmful to the system of natural liberty,
besides administrative costs proper. 
It is worth stressing that inspection procedures familiar to
today’s routines – access to accounting registers, systematic assessment
of taxable values – meant “... unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppres-
sion...” (Smith, 1976a, p. 827) for Smith. Because of such inconveniences,
he suggested that taxes, such as those incident upon profits or interests,
be left aside and recommended the avoidance of any search for equality
supposedly conducive to vexation.
The scope of the fourth maxim is ample. Extended to its limits,
the warning not to obstruct certain branches of business would restrict
the number of adequate taxes, since any tax affecting totally or partially
the price of the taxed good alters the economic equilibrium. However, the
fact that Smith’s equilibrium analysis was not led to its extreme, since it
did not take into consideration the impacts of the price changes on the
producers themselves, the range of the fourth maxim remains limited. As
a matter of fact, Smith did not go beyond the consequences immediately
related to his theory of income determination.
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To conclude: together with the income theory, the four max-
ims provide a comprehensive framework for a concrete analysis of taxa-
tion. The maxims explain great part of the admitted transgressions to the
theory of incidence, and provide a hierarchy of principles which deter-
mines the criteria for the judgement of taxes. Anyway, besides these
principles, and as a kind of reasoning in last resource, Smith used an
ultimate historical standard: in his vision, the English system of public
finance was a paradigm of non-interventionism in private business,
comparatively to other countries. Highly inconvenient taxes, as taxes on
wage goods, happened to be tolerated because there were no reasonable
alternatives for the levying of the necessary amount of resources and –
principally – because the percentages applied to the same taxes were still
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24 The taxes on necessaries, for example, are criticized because they imply a
nominal wage increase, but their impacts on the producers of basic goods are
not taken into account. The allocation effects of the taxes on luxury goods –
defended for other reasons – are also ignored by Smith.higher in other countries. The Wealth of Nations displays several other
arguments for the superiority of the English fiscal system, comparatively
to others: better mechanisms for the levying of the land-rent tax, the role
of custom taxes, the cautious taxation on profits etc.
The conclusion that follows Smith’s criticism to the taxes on
luxury goods may be taken as his ultimate approval of the English fiscal
system. Even though the taxes on luxury goods admittedly collide with
the fourth maxim in all of the four possible senses, Smith says, they are
a bearable fiscal instrument because:
“The inconveniences ... which are, perhaps, in
some degree inseparable from taxes upon consu-
mable commodities, fall as light upon the people
of Great Britain as upon those of any other coun-
try of which the government is nearly as expen-
sive”. (Smith, 1976a, p. 899)
The final statement is quite clear: “Our state is not perfect,
and might be mended; but it is as good or better than that of most of our
neighbours”. (Smith, 1976a, p. 899)
5 FINAL REMARKS
Going beyond its role as a source in taxation matters, Book
V has served as a major point of reference in the ample debates on Smith
and economic liberalism. The passages on the “duties of the sovereign”,
particularly, have many times been used in the current criticism of the
governmental economic initiatives as well as an authoritative argument
in favour of private business. The scenario of Book V’s first and second
chapters – preoccupation with the increasing tax burden, concern about
the harmful effects of ill-conceived taxes –, added to the frequent allusions
to the inefficiency of public service, might induce an ultra-liberal inter-
pretation of Smith’s position.
However, the ultra-liberal use of Smith’s chapters on public
revenues is hardly immune to criticism. First of all, it is meaningful to ask
if there is any need for further endorsement of the Smithean thesis on the
primacy of private business, after Book I. The establishment of the system
of natural liberty and its corollaries, which include the demonstration of the
private character of the modern wealth, is sufficiently accomplished by the
first chapters of the Wealth of Nations and exhaustively complemented by
the arguing against mercantilism in Book IV. The chapters presenting
Smith’s view on the division of labour, exchange, trade, and profit form a
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market system. The theoretical integrity of Book I is generally under-
rated by those who concentrate in the sharper ideological rhetoric of Book
V in their endorsement of a liberal view.
Secondly, Smith’s eloquent criticism to the efficiency of pub-
lic management also applies to the privately-owned business. In reality,
Smith distrusted the big organisation, governmental or not, because it
entailed an absence of direct control by the owners, most harmful to
economic efficiency. In a symmetrical way, Book V passages criticising
joint-stock companies and regulated companies do not prove the inferi-
ority of private business. They are just secondary remarks, in the context
of an attack to commercial privileges.
The recollection of the reasons for having commercial privi-
leges, a topic exhaustively debated in Book IV, put back in Book V, is quite
insightful. In Book V’s context, Smith was analysing the “publick works
and institutions to facilitate particular branches of commerce”, in con-
trast to those related to “commerce in general”. Within this context, his
attention was driven to the public works developed to the benefit of big
trade companies. According to Smith, as far as the colonial trade required
a strong governmental support, in the form of garrisons and diplomatic
action, it seemed reasonable to have its protection defrayed by means of
a specific tax, to be levied from trade companies. This is just a strict use
of the benefit principle, but the remark that this kind of funding cannot
be extended to commerce in general, because
“The protection of trade in general has always been
considered as essential to the defence of the com-
monwealth, and, upon that account, a necessary
part of the duty of the executive power”.  (Smith,
1976a, p. 733)
Therefore requiring a general tax, is quite suggestive. In
referring to a duty “essential to the defence of the commonwealth”, this
passage shows that the rationale for an entailing part of the third duty
rests on political considerations.     
It is important to stress the subtle position of the “duties of
the sovereign” in Smith’s exposition. These duties do not represent an
exhaustive (and restrictive) list of government obligations, in the sense,
for instance, of Petty’s famous list of governmental tasks, in the Treatise
on Taxes and Contributions. The duties are not a rational and
theoretical device to assess the optimal conditions for governmental
expenditure – as the concept of public good implies – either. The “duties
of the sovereign” simply partake Smith’s broad conception of government
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interest but also considers the general and not precisely measurable
benefits provided to the whole society.
Instead of looking for a strict rationality quest, we would
rather consider that the “duties of the sovereign” passages partake
Smith’s conception of the advantages of life in a state-organised society.
Far from being a contractarian, in the Lockian sense, Smith was quite
sensible to the benefits brought about by the political society. In other
words, he admitted that the government accrues to individual interest,
but did not derive from this conclusion a contractarian-individualistic
theory of the state. His conception of state-organised societies lays both
on the utility and on the authority principle.
All public works and institutions, including those that “fa-
cilitate the commerce”, benefit both the nation and the immediately
concerned businessmen, but they cannot be defended neither on individ-
ual benefit grounds nor on strictly measurable collective gains grounds.
Needless to say, if public works produce an indisputable individual
benefit, their beneficiaries should at any rate participate in the defrayal
of the expenses.  
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